

## Conflict Management In Somalia

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### Abstract

The Somalia conflict is rooted in issues of identity, war culture, external influences, struggle over power and resources, and a lack of social, economic and political infrastructure. When approaching the Somali conflict, it is important to take a holistic approach when addressing the root causes to the many issues that Somalia faces. There should be a strong focus on partnership, collaboration and women empowerment in order to ensure effectiveness and sustainability. The international community has a strong responsibility for ensuring human security and alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. When designing a plan for conflict resolution, the foci should be on civic engagement, good governance and communication.

Unlike many African populations, the overwhelming majority of the Somalis are part of a single, homogeneous ethnic group. All Somalis are Muslim and share the same language and culture. Nevertheless, one of the most terrible civil wars in Africa has been waged in this country for more than two decades. Somalia has been without a functioning central government since the late dictator General Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted in 1991. This essay examines the root causes of the Somali conflict and analyses some of the obstacles that have plagued peace efforts for the last fourteen years. Finally, it identifies peace-building strategies that could help establish durable peace in Somalia. We argue that competition for resources and power, repression by the military regime and the colonial legacy are the background causes of the conflict. Politicised clan identity, the availability of weapons and the presence of a large number of unemployed youth have exacerbated the problem. With regard to the obstacles to peace, we contend that Ethiopia's hostile policy, the absence of major power interest, lack of resources and the warlords' lack of interest in peace are the major factors that continue to haunt the Somali peace process. Finally, we propose ambitious peace-building strategies that attempt to address the key areas of security, political governance, economic development and justice in order to build a durable peace in Somalia.

## **1.0 Introduction:**

As in many other African nations, Somalia exists in a state of legal pluralism where customary law religious law (Sharia) and secular law operate. Among the three, dominant system that governs societal relations and serious crimes, due to a variety of historical and political reasons. Its persistence through years of civil war was primarily due to its core position underpinning the legitimacy of Somali traditional structures, especially in the provision of justice and arbitration, as first the Somali state and then society fractured. In this article, the experience of the Danish Demining Group (DDG) is highlighted to illustrate how traditional systems of customary law were reinvigorated to include women and young people, and formalised in written text to improve conflict resolution with a human rights approach.

The importance of in the Somali context was and is, for the most part, indisputable. Much like the clan system, it is an ever-present part of the Somali way of life. Throughout the 1990s civil war and its aftermath, traditional structures and the elders who practice it were a consistent resource for communal conflict resolution and, in a way, security. However, the process is not without its flaws. Historically, women and minority groups – such as the Bantu tribes and agrarian Somalis – suffered discrimination within these processes and were not permitted a voice. Moreover, legitimacy was also not without questioning. In some areas of southern Somalia, warlords and their military power superseded

traditional respect for elders. In addition, Al-Shabaab controlled areas only followed by Sharia law.

Bearing this in mind, DDG's initiative, Civic Engagement in Reconciliation and State Formation in Southern Somalia (CERSF), aimed to revitalize preserving its community aspect and strengthening its legitimacy at the local level. The approach was to build the capacity of elders to solve or mediate conflicts focused on root causes (rather than arbitrate high-value cases) in a way that was compatible with human rights standards and promoted the inclusion of women, youth and other underrepresented groups. This initiative is part of DDG's armed violence reduction work, to reduce the impact of conflict and armed violence by mitigating the threats that small arms and light weapons pose to human security and development. This includes improving the relationship between community decision-making bodies, security providers and the community at large through facilitated dialogue and building conflict management and mediation capacity in key stakeholders.

## **2.0 Discussions**

### **2.1 Somalia Conflict Analysis :**

The most effective methods and best practices for building peace in Somalia. The Somali conflict is historically rooted and extraordinarily complex, which requires a holistic approach to conflict resolution in order to achieve sustainable peace. This case study analysis will begin with a brief overview the Somali conflict in terms of historical civil, international and global events. Military movements related to the

Somali conflict will outline these events in light of the political, economic and social environments in which the disputes transpire. The analytical framework for exploring the Somali conflict will be developed in the context of human security.

The conflict analysis will include a stakeholder analysis that identifies the primary and secondary actors, as well as the third parties and external actors, involved in the civil war in Somalia. The establishment of the root causes, which includes parties' motivations and underlying fears, will follow. The conflict dynamics and political actors will be identified and explored through conflict analysis, which will be preceded by an exploration of the issues, scope, stage and phase of conflict. The final objective for this framework will be to consider the history of peacemaking efforts in Somalia with regard to times of peace, changes and attempts at settlement.

Outlining the analytical framework will lead into a context analysis. During this review, donor efforts will be examined in light of civic engagement around governance initiatives. Priority areas will be identified in terms of peace building and civic engagement. This section will conclude with a peace building and conflict resolution assessment with regard to the required peace building structures and feasible, effective mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Upon completion of the context analysis, a civic engagement strategy will be designed. This will begin with the investigation of local civic engagement as it relates to the social construction of peace. A

participant list will be created after indicating the diversity of stakeholders. The cataloguing of these groups will be preceded by a plan for implementation that incorporates a proposal for coordination with and participation by the Federal Government of Somalia. The final stage of this grand design will be a scheme for the communications strategy, which will focus on spreading results within the associated geographic areas.

This piece will draw to a close with a work plan, which includes a list of recommendations for conflict management based on the best practices for conflict management delineated by the United States Institute of Peace, in addition to a corresponding timeline that correlates with holistic approaches to peace building. The appendices will include recommendations for future works, such as a monthly progress reports that should be based on the provided outline in order to effectively identify the challenges encountered and lessons learned through the process of implementation based on progress indicators within the timeline. If effective and feasible, these resolutions could provide a foundation for future peace building initiatives in Somalia, as well as around the globe.

## **2.2 History of the Somali Conflict**

The conflict in Somalia is unique in comparison to other international conflicts because it began with a civil war within a relatively hegemonic culture in terms of religion, language and ethnicity (Samatar, 2001). Historically, Somalia was a European colony that was

divided into five states. These dynamics, in combination with the Cold War stimulating exploitation and oppression and Somali wars with neighboring states, created a clash of political ideologies in Somalia (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). The dictator of Somalia, Siyad Baare, was overthrown in 1991 due to the instability that resulted when Western foreign aid was withdrawn after the Cold War (Bjorn, 2009). This event was followed by a series of cross-clan disputes, which resulted in massacres, famine, mass displacement within and outside of Somalia, and the collapse of social and economic infrastructure. This ultimately ended in the divide between the northern and southern regions of Somalia (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

Peace building efforts in Somalia have had limited effect due to the use of traditional mechanisms in a constantly evolving, sensitive situation (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). There are

Peace building efforts in Somalia have had limited effect due to the use of traditional mechanisms in a constantly evolving, sensitive situation (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). There are many outside actors that have influenced and exacerbated the situation in Somalia, which includes the surrounding states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, as well as international actors like the United Nations and the United States (BBU, 2013). Thus far, humanitarian aid and military interventions have failed to alleviate the tensions and have contributed to the escalation of the conflict because efforts have not focused on mediation or conflict resolution. This has generated hostile views of foreign

aid amongst militant Islamist movements, which led to an attack against a multinational force working on the Somali crises mission for the UN. The attack was a contributing factor for a period of international disengagement, which reopened the environment for confrontations to continue (Bradbury & Healy, 2010)

Some communities have been working towards establishing governance structures in order to develop public administrations and civil governments. From these efforts, a series of decentralized administrations, autonomous governments, and unstable and uncoordinated informal governance structures have emerged (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). These establishments improved security in Somalia and shifted the phase of conflict from crisis to unstable peace (USIP, 2008). With the absence of Western assistance came the rise of reconciliation initiatives by regional states that operated under social, economic and political agendas. The clash between the objectives and approaches of each of these parties only worsened the instability and regional divisions in Somalia (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

International entities reengaged with the Somali conflict upon the production of a Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000, which was inspired the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti. The success of this conference can be attributed to collaborative, participative and representative methods used for the inclusion Somali society in the decision-making and planning process. Unfortunately, TNG did not enact efforts for reconciliation established by the conference, which created a sense

of mistrust and betrayal amongst Somali citizens who were not associated with the benefiting Mogadishu clans and business class. As a result, the crises resurged as the opposition coalition labeled the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) surfaced with support from Ethiopia (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

The construction of these dynamics, in addition to the sense of international insecurity that resulted from 9/11, created an environment in Somalia that became of interest to international terrorists. This led to the reengagement of the international community due to a concern for global security. TNG was already dominated by Islamists and continued to gain support from and work under the influence of Islamic Courts and Islamic charities that are associated with

militant Islamists. This led to a shift in power from TNG to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was dominated by federalist coalition supported by the Darood clan and Ethiopia. This was followed by the formation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which sought to institute an Islamic state in Somalia. ICU was ultimately ousted by TFG with reinforcement from Ethiopia and the Western governments (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). Upon conclusion of the transitional period of government, the new Federal Government of Somalia was elected in 2012 in an effort to rebuild social, economic and political structures in Somalia (FGoS, 2013).

### **2.3 Stakeholder Analysis**

The Conflict Observer Project of Babes-Bolyai University (2013) outlines the history of primary actors in the Somali conflict since the liberation movements began in 1978. There have been a series of armed conflicts since 1978 that involve a number of Somali clan-based liberation groups, Somali militia groups, Somali governments and militant Islamist groups, as well as secondary actors such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Radio Halgan and the international community. The following identifies the primary and secondary actors, as well as third parties and external actors, and their roles and impacts throughout the Somali conflict. These key players can be placed into five categories: militia groups, clan-based liberation movements, nonviolent political oppositions, opposition clan-based groups, and government organizations (BBU, 2013).

### **2.4 Primary Actors.**

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), led by Abdullahi Yusuf, is a militia that was established in 1978 with a mission to fight the Somali Army and overthrow Somali dictator, Siad Barre, after losing the Ogaden War with Ethiopia. Somali warlords formed the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) militia group, which was in opposition to the Transitional National Government (TNG). The Al-Shabaab militant group is a radicalized faction of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was created in opposition to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and later identified as the Somali Al-Qaeda. The Sufis ASWJ is a moderate militant group against Al-Shabaab (BBU, 2013).

The Hawiye, Isaaq, Ogadeni and Majerten clans formed the clan-based liberation movements United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National Movement (SNM), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (SSDM), respectively. A war between the SNM and the Somali military led to the proclamation of Somaliland in 1991. Nonviolent political oppositions include the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG) (BBU, 2013).

Ultimately, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) overthrew Siad Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) in 1991. Following this, the Abgal clan and Habargidir clan, two parties of the Hawiye clan and the Hiraab sub-clan, took control of Somalia. Eventually, a power struggle arose between these two groups that was inspired by the fall of Mogadishu to USC. Upon the fall of the Somali government, opposition clan-based groups formed and experienced power struggles due to opposing goals. These groups include the Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye, Digil and Mirifle clans. There were also other conflicts over resources that involved opposition leaders Mohamed Farah Aideed (SNA) and Ali Mahdi Mohamed (BBU, 2013).

There have been a number of changes in power and governance since Barre was overthrown, which includes the establishment of the three Somali regions: Somaliland, Puntland and South-central Somalia, in addition to the TNG, TFG and ultimately, the Federal Government of Somalia. Initially,

President Salat Hassan and Prime Minister Ali Khalif Gelayadh were elected to govern Somalia when TFG was established. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, arose in opposition to TFG and gained control of Southern Somalia. ICU was defeated in 2007 and was dispersed into factions, some of which were radicalized (BBU, 2013).

## 2.5 Secondary Actors.

Secondary actors in the Somali conflict include neighboring countries and international actors who support humanitarian and peace building efforts in Somalia. Djibouti facilitated the Somali government formation meetings and supports African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was authorized by the UN to replace the proposed Peace Support Mission to Somalia designed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and facilitated by the UN Security Council. IGAD supported both sides because it was compiled of secondary actors with varying agendas, which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. AMISOM, “supports transitional governmental structures, implements a national security plan, trains the Somali security forces, and assists in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid,” (BBU, 2013:1). AMISOM is also supported by a number of secondary actors, which include Malawi, Nigeria, Burundi, Tanzania, the European Union (E.U.), Ghana and Kenya. Kenya also housed Somalia’s new government in 2000 due to the severity of the conflict and helped to restrain al-Shabaab Islamist militants in Somalia. Finally, Sudan

hosted transitional government and UIC peace talks (BBU, 2013).

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## **2.6 Third Parties.**

There are many third party international actors that play a role in the conflict in Somalia. These parties

have become involved sporadically throughout history in relation to global events. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were suppliers of resources to Somalia. When the Somali Civil Wars began, the United Nations (UN) provided aid but was subjected to extreme violence. The UN established the International Somalia Contact Group as a leader to end the transition government through means of peace and reconciliation. The UN continued humanitarian and stabilization efforts through the establishment of the peacekeepers coalition, United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), which ended in the Battle of Mogdishu (BBU, 2013).

The United States led many humanitarian efforts in Somalia, which includes UNOSOM II, in addition to facilitating equipment distribution to AMISOM along with France. The United Kingdom (UK) is particularly interested in the Somali conflict and provides extensive development assistance due to its concern for the Somali people and the direct affects this conflict has on the UK. The Arab League promotes peace and is responsible for the provision of funding for the negotiation process. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) is currently responsible for security assurance in Somalia. There are many humanitarian aid organizations involved in the Somali crises, which include the Red Cross, Mediciens sans Frontieres, CARE, CARITAS, OXFAM, Save the Children, in addition to fifty-two aiding or supporting NGOs. International Maritime Organization and the World Food Program have reported on the issue of piracy in Somalia (BBU, 2013).

## 2.7 External Actors.

The 2009 DIIS Report examines the role of external actors in the Somali conflict since dictator, Siyad Baare, was overthrown in 1991. International interventions, which include those by the United Nations and the United States, have failed to alleviate and have even exacerbated the conflict in Somalia, which ultimately allowed Islamist extremists to gain control. The following identifies the external actors and how these actors have contributed to the crises. These actors may be placed into four categories: neighboring states, international organizations, non-regional foreign powers and non-state actors (Bjorn, 2009).

Actions by the international community to address the Somali conflict seem to have been inspired by the issues of piracy that has resulted from the lack of security in this country, which has impacted international shipping. The international community essentially ignored the humanitarian issues in Somalia until the 1990s when the United Nations launched UNOSOM-I, which was designed with weak strategies and a lack of resources. The US led UNOSOM-II within the US intervention, UNITAF, which produced ill-defined roles in terms of authority. The US proceeded to declare war against warlord Mohammed Aideed, which led to the occurrence of Black Hawk Down and the withdrawal of US forces in 1994. This ultimately created more chaos than that which was aimed to be resolved with the original mission of UNOSOM-II, thus generating feelings of resentment and mistrust by the Somalis for the US and the UN (Bjorn, 2009).

Upon disengagement of international forces, Ethiopia played a role in disabling anti-Ethiopian factions fighting in Somalia. Al Qaeda failed to establish support in Somalia during this time. When the peacekeepers departed, Somalia operated without a functioning state through the organization of clans that were managed by clan elders. Islamic institutions took on the role providing a social welfare system and a judicial system with the support of the entrepreneurial business community, which increased security. Unfortunately, these systems did not fairly represent all Somali citizens and eventually required a transitional government. The TNG was formed at the Djibouti peace conference in 2000 and was meant to provide fair representation to all Somali groups. TNG was weak in terms of power and security, thus lacking legitimacy against the US and the EU (Bjorn, 2009).

Ultimately, TNG was ousted and a transitional federal charter was adopted to outline the transitional federal institutions (TFI), which includes the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) and the TFG. These institutions failed to effectively address the shortfalls of TNG by creating a system of appointment for TFI, which hinders fair representation, as well as failing to establish a system of governance within TFG. During the time of its formation, TFG was harbored in Kenya due to the extreme violence and lack of security in Somalia. TFG was unable to solicit support from the UN and the AU to relocate to Baidoa in Somalia, which led to the providing of their protection by Ethiopia. TFG denied the presence of Ethiopian troops until the invasion in 2006, which allowed TFG to take control in



Mogadishu and caused the resurgence of the civil war. These actions denied TFG the international support needed to succeed, thus creating the need for another transformation in collaboration with the ARS, which resulted in an expanded TFP and a unity TFG (Bjorn, 2009).

By 2006, the northern part of South/Central Somalia was under the control of the UIC, Somali warlords had formed a counter-terrorism alliance and Ethiopia was continuing to meddle with the stability of the country. After 9/11, the US began to solicit support from Somali warlords for the war on terror, some of which came from former associates of TFI and TFG who ultimately formed the US supported Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). This organization inspired the construction of a counter-alliance of UIC that ultimately defeated ARPCT and proceeded to reduce conflict and improve stability, security and mobilization in Somalia. The relations between UIC and TFG remained unstable and uncertain in terms of collaboration due to conflicts of interests in relation to foreign forces (Bjorn, 2009).

UIC formed a jihad against TFG supported Ethiopian military intervention. UIC also supported Ogadeen National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), in addition to forming relations with Eritrea, an anti-Ethiopia state. Eventually, Ethiopia drove UIC out of power with the support of TFG, which ultimately inspired terrorist activities against Ethiopian militias, humanitarian organizations, UN agencies and Somali civilians. This put TFG in the position of dominant control at Somalia's capital with

the support of Ethiopia but without legitimacy. These activities produced a humanitarian crisis in Somalia due to the resulting mass displacement and malnutrition, stunted humanitarian assistance and emergence of piracy. These transitions were followed by counterinsurgent warfare by TFG, Ethiopia and AMISOM, in addition to many acts of terrorism, particularly those by al-Shabaab whose leader, Ayro, was assassinated in a US airstrike in 2008. Ethiopia eventually withdrew its forces after the Djibouti peace agreement between TFG and ARS, leaving Somalia weak and divided (Bjorn, 2009).

## **2.8 Root Causes:**

The 2006 African Security Review conducted by the Institute for Security Studies explores the root causes, obstacles and peace-building strategies related to the Somali conflict. Competition for resources and power, military repression, oppression, violence, poverty, displacement, lack of security, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, a missing motive for peace, in addition to Ethiopia's role, have inspired, fueled and inflamed the conflict in Somalia. The following identifies and elaborates on the root causes, as well as parties' motivations and underlying fears in the Somali conflict (Barise, 2006).

The Somali civil war has multiple and complex causes including political, economic, cultural and psychological. Various external and internal actors have played different roles during the various stages of the conflict. Based on our observations and readings of peace-building literature, we argue that

the root causes of the Somali conflict were competition for resources and/or power, a repressive state and the colonial legacy. We also regard as contributing causes the politicised clan identity, the availability of weapons, the large numbers of unemployed youth, and certain aspects of the Somali culture that sanction the use of violence. The most important factor that has created and sustained the clan-based militias' conflicts is competition for power and resources. As literature in this area suggests and the collective memories of the Somalis attest, Somali clans had often clashed over resources such as water, livestock (camels) and grazing long before Somalia became a sovereign country.<sup>1</sup> Using the widely accepted Somali traditional legal system, historically traditional leaders settled these conflicts. However, after Somalia gained its independence, many Somalis moved to urban areas, so the types of resources that are needed and the means used to obtain them have changed. *Politica 34 African Security Review* 15.1 Institute for Security Studies leaders realised that whoever controlled the state would control the nation's resources. Access to government resources, recruitment of civil servants and control of foreign aid replaced control of water wells and access to grazing issues in the countryside. For instance, Mohamed Jama Urdoh, a Somali journalist, observed Somalia's police forces in 1967. He revealed in an investigative report that more than 70 per cent (51 out of 71) of police-station chiefs were members of the same clan as the then police chief.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the police chief was just one example of how government officials

were misusing their power. Besides the political patronage appointments that characterised the civil service, corruption affected all levels and departments of the government. With regards to government policy, the frequently cited examples include the use of Somalia's police and army forces for clannish reasons. Within two clans, the Lelkase and the Ayr, there is a widespread belief that the government of the day and the police used excessive force against them.

As corrupt as it was, Somalia's first government was democratic. It had checks and balances and people could talk and address the corruption. The Somali leaders of the time were poorly educated novices with little experience in running a government. Nevertheless, the former prime minister, Abdirizak Haji Hussein, had some success in dealing with security and corruption problems during his reign. However, when General Mohamed Siad Barre took over power in October 1969 things changed. For the first few years the revolutionary council built new institutions and wrote down the Somali language. However, the general's obsession with controlling and consolidating his power to the benefit of members of his clan became clear to all Somalis. Opposition groups were outlawed and no one could criticise the military leaders. Since elites from specific clans controlled all levers of state power and the economy, the leadership of the opposition capitalised on this opportunity. After the 1977/1978 war between Somalia and Ethiopia, a number of military officers attempted to take over the government. When this coup failed, the Siad Barre

regime started to use excessive force against the Majerteen clan (the clan to which most of the officers belonged). This event was the beginning of Somalia's civil war. Other clans such as the Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye and Digil and Mirifle also started opposition groups in order to seize power. Current realities confirm this assertion that competition for power and/or resources was the leading cause of conflict among clans and militia groups. The civil war within the Hawiye, the Darod, the Digil and Mirifle, and the Isaaq clans was a resource- and/or power-motivated conflict. For instance, the Abgal and the Habargidir clans had never fought throughout their history and in fact belong to the same clan (Hawiye) and sub-clan (Hiraab). However, when Mogadishu fell to the United Somali Congress (USC) (to which they both belonged) a power struggle broke out between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. In addition, people interviewed confirmed that

the civil war between the Habargidir and the Hawadle clans started in Kismayo over the control of Kismayo port (when the USC controlled the city). Then there were other conflicts over the state farms in Qoryooley district. Finally, this war spread to the Mogadishu and Hiiraan regions. The war between the Darod clans was similarly motivated. First, the Absame and the Harti militias fought over the control of Kismayo. Then the Marehaan and the Harti clans clashed over the same issue. The recent civil war between the Majerteen sub-clans in Puntland was also motivated by power and resources. When Abdullahi Yusuf was voted out in 2001, he refused to accept his defeat and sought to

retain control of the government by force. The same kinds of events occurred during the civil violence between the Isaaq clans in Bur'o and Hargeysa, and the continuing clashes between the Digil and Mirifle clans in the Bay and Bakool regions .

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### 3. Conclusion.

Somali culture and literature can offer useful tools and techniques for attaining and sustaining peace. For instance, Somalia's poet and composer Mohamed I Warsame 'Hadrawi' launched his peace caravan on 1 July 2003. Hadrawi told the Somali media that he wanted to travel to as many cities and towns as he could. He stressed that he would like to share a message of peace with his people, regardless of the part of the country in which they are living.<sup>42</sup> Hadrawi is known for his bravery and principled position against the former military regime. He was imprisoned for composing poems and plays that criticised former military leaders. Hadrawi's peace caravan came at a time that the Somali conflict was 'ripe for resolution'.<sup>43</sup> He employed relevant and homegrown values and delivered his message through poems and speeches.<sup>44</sup> The peace caravan had all the necessary features because it addressed the important issues

that Somalis face in a way that did not provoke or invite violence. Building on the strengths of the peace caravan is important. Hadrawi has shown that if the content and the pedagogy of peace education programmes are consistent with Islamic values and Somali culture, these programmes will succeed. This lesson is very important, because the perceptions of local groups are crucial. In addition, as anthropologists and historians have documented, Somalis put a high value on literature, particularly poems. The Somali people have been called “the nation of poets”.<sup>45</sup> Literature has been an important tool in Somalia for wars of liberation and for peace activists. Using literature as the pedagogy of peace is helpful in changing the Somali people’s attitudes and behaviours. Finally, we believe that peace education programmes promoting Islamic values such as tolerance, respect, care and empathy that employ an appropriate pedagogy might produce positive results.

**Conclusion**In the first section of this article we

#### 4. Reference:

I M Lewis, *Modern history of the Somali: Revised, updated & expanded*, Ohio University Press, 2002, pp 1–18. See also John Markakis, *Resource conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Sage, London, 1998 (Introduction and Part II, Ethnic and clan movements section). Lee V Cassanelli, *Somali land resource issues in historical perspective*, in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The lessons of armed humanitarian intervention*, Westview Press, 1997, pp 67–77.2 Mohamed Jama Urdoh (07/09/1967), Al-

Yoom

outlined the background causes of the Somali conflict. We argued that competition for power and resources, the colonial legacy and state repression were the long-term causes of the Somali conflict. We also noted that clan identity, the availability of weapons and the presence of unemployed youth have exacerbated the civil war. While we recognised the importance of clan identity within Somali society, we argued that the politicisation of this identity is merely a guise for the elites’ pursuit of power and economic interests. In the second part we identified the main factors that have sustained the conflict for 14 years. We argued that Ethiopia’s hostile policy toward Somalia, the warlords’ lack of interest in peace, Somalia’s meagre resources and the absence of major-power interest are the major factors that have plagued peace efforts in Somalia. In the final section we proposed peace-building strategies that we thought would help the search for peace. To end politically motivated clan skirmishes and organised crime we suggested that

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